Change in Perceptions of Creator Legal Liability and Backer Legal Protection
A maintained assumption underlying our test design is that, while prior to the rule change there was limited awareness that consumer protection laws would apply to Kickstarter creators and backers (see Ganatra, 2016) , the revision of Kickstarter's terms of use altered perceptions of creator legal liability and backer legal protection. In other words, we contend that the new rules changed the perceived litigation risk faced by project creators and, consequently, the legal recourse opportunities for backers, even though the actual consumer protection laws did not change. To provide support for this assumption, we take a four-pronged approach. First, we document the different means through which Kickstarter advertised the change in terms of use.
Second, we analyze mainstream and tech-dedicated media reactions to the rule change. Third, we investigate how the change in terms of use was discussed on social media. Finally, we conduct empirical tests whose evidence further backs our claim that the rule change significantly increased the awareness of creators and backers regarding the applicability of consumer protection laws to crowdfunding. We explain our approach in more detail in the following sections.
Announcement of the Change in Kickstarter's Terms of Use
We explore how Kickstarter publicized the introduction of its new terms of use. We find that the rule change was widely announced on Kickstarter's website, on social media, as well as via email to all registered users (including all prior or current backers and creators registered on the website).
We present evidence on the different means used by Kickstarter to publicize its new terms of use in Figure OA -5. Given the extensive coverage and wide reach of the announcement, we believe it is very unlikely that Kickstarter's registered users, social media followers, backers, and creators were not aware of the rule change.
These tech-outlets emphasized to a large extent the increased legal liability of creators and the increased legal protection of backers. For example, on September 19, 2014, TechCrunch published an article stating:
"Kickstarter also reminds creators that they need to be "honest" and not make "material misrepresentations in their communication to backers." (In other words, scammers beware.) Additionally, the terms now state that creators who are unable to stand by the promises they made in their project may be subject to legal action by backers."
Other online publications followed suit, with Polygon and SlashGear, for example, emphasizing that creators not delivering rewards "open themselves up to possible legal action from backers" and respectively using the following headlines to advertise the change:
"Kickstarter updates terms to address creators who fail to deliver on their projects" and "Kickstarter changes rules so nobody runs off with your money."
While this change naturally received more attention from online outlets devoted to technology and gaming, it was also covered by the mainstream media, including NBC News, Time Magazine, and the Washington Post. 2 For example, NBC News reported:
"Kickstarter is trying to codify the current swampy situation around projects canceled after creators have the cash in hand. (…) If creators don't make good on the promises made in their campaigns, they must explain what happened, return any unused funds, and could face potential legal action from backers."
Time Magazine highlighted the difference between moral hazard problems (i.e., making deceitful disclosures and then taking the money and running) and bad business decisions, clarifying that the former may lead to legal action following the rule change:
"In the event that a scammer takes everyone's money and runs, Kickstarter won't offer a refund or even chip in for legal fees. But at least in those cases there's a clear basis for taking legal action (fraud); when money is squandered in a more conventional way -through bad business decisions -funders have no recourse at all."
Collectively, the analysis of the media coverage suggests that the media found the change in terms of use to be meaningful and consequential and to have implications for creator accountability and backer protection.
Reactions to the Change in Kickstarter's Terms of Use on Twitter
To gain additional insights into how backers and creators perceived the rule change, we next investigate whether and how the change in Kickstarter's terms of use was discussed on social media. We believe this type of analysis can bring. In Figure OA Combined, the anecdotal evidence presented in Sections 1.1 to 1.3 supports our assumption that (potential) backers and creators were indeed aware of the rule change and its implications in terms of increased creator legal liability and backer legal protection. In fact,
given the way in which Kickstarter disclosed the change in terms of use, the coverage of this change by mainstream and specialized media outlets, and the discussion that ensued on social media, it is unlikely that users of Kickstarter were unaware of the rule change and its implications. Nevertheless, in Section 1.4, we conduct a series of empirical tests to provide further support to the key underlying assumption of our research design.
FTC Consumer Complaints and Backer Comments
To offer further support to our maintained assumption that the change in Kickstarter's terms of use changed the perceptions of creators and backers regarding the applicability of preexisting state consumer protection regulation to reward crowdfunding, we conduct two sets of empirical tests. First, we investigate whether the number of consumer complaints increases following the introduction of the new terms of use. Second, we check backer comments to examine whether, following the introduction of the new terms of use and the resulting increase in creator legal liability, backer satisfaction increases and the number of fraudulent campaigns and projects with delayed reward delivery decreases.
We made a request to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for a list of all consumer complaints involving the Kickstarter platform. The list we obtained from the FTC includes 369 complaints made as of September 4, 2018. While project names and backer (consumer) identifying information are unavailable to us because redacted, the file we received from the FTC contains information regarding the address (and state) of each consumer making a complaint. This information allows us to test whether the number of consumer complaints increases following the change in Kickstarter's terms of use, and whether this increase is more pronounced in states with stricter consumer protection laws, consistent with the role of consumer protection becoming more salient to backers subsequent to the rule change. 3
The increase in consumer complaints appears evident from simple descriptive statistics:
backers made 51 complaints to the FTC in the 64 months preceding the change in terms of use and 315 complaints in the 59 months that followed it (three additional complaints were made in the month of the rule change, September 2014).
To further examine whether the effect of the change in terms of use varies across states with different levels of consumer protection, we regress the number of complaints by state and
year-month on the interaction term . Our model specification includes state and year-month fixed effects to control for state and year-month unobservable factors and, therefore, excludes the main effects of and , as these variables are collinear with the state and year-month fixed effects, respectively. The results of this analysis are presented in Column (1) of Table OA-3. The coefficient on is positive and significant, suggesting that, following the change in terms of use, the number of consumer complaints increases in states with stronger consumer protection laws. In untabulated tests, we further control for the number of projects in each state and year. The statistical significance and economic magnitude of the coefficient on remain unchanged.
To assess whether the change in consumer protection was followed by an improvement in backer satisfaction and a decrease in the number of projects with delayed reward delivery and projects that bakers allege as fraudulent, we conduct a textual analysis of backer comments.
We restrict our analysis to comments made by backers of successfully-funded projects after the end of the funding period. We begin by estimating the sentiment of backer comments for each funded project and compute the average backer sentiment of all projects in a given state and
year-month. We then identify comments that mention the terms "fraud," "delay," and/or respective synonyms, and compute the percentage of successfully-funded projects in a given state and year-month with comments that include each of these sets of words. Our empirical tests, reported in Columns (2) to (4) of Table OA-3, suggest an increase in the sentiment of backers, a lower incidence of reward delivery delays, and a lower percentage of projects with fraud allegations in states with stricter consumer protection following the change in terms of use.
The combined anecdotal and empirical evidence presented in this section strongly backs our assumption that perceptions of creator legal liability and backer legal protection indeed changed following the introduction of Kickstarter's new terms of use.
Why Did Kickstarter Change Its Terms of Use?
In this section, we discuss potential factors that may have influenced Kickstarter's decision to revise its terms of use and how we control for these factors in our empirical analysis.
When Kickstarter announced the change in terms of use on its blog, it indicated that the goal of the change was to "make sure every part of the Kickstarter system is clear and straightforward." An analysis of Twitter activity, Google searches, news articles, and websites related to technology and crowdfunding suggests that the change in terms of use may have been prompted by the negative coverage received by a set of highly-publicized projects that may have led Kickstarter to consider potential reputational costs. This idea is echoed by some of the Twitter activity surrounding the change. For example: @isatismktg: "Popular #crowdfunding website Kickstarter introducing new rules to improve confidence."
In the months preceding the rule change, the number of Google searches for Kickstarter rules increased (see Figure OA -7). This increasing interest suggests that the decision to clarify the nature of the contract between backers and creators, and clearly spell out the possibility of legal action, may have been driven by increased uncertainty regarding the rights and obligations of backers and creators, respectively.
Another related factor that may have played a role is Kickstarter's desire to clarify that the platform bears no legal responsibility for funded projects that do not deliver rewards. In fact, the new terms of use specifically state: "Kickstarter is not part of this contract -the contract is a direct legal agreement between creators and their backers." They further include a section titled "Stuff we don't do and aren't responsible for," in which Kickstarter specifically states that they "don't oversee the performance or punctuality of projects" and "don't endorse any content users submit to the Site."
To assess whether the change in terms of use might have been triggered also by other factors, we further examine the volume of web traffic on Kickstarter.com ( Figure OA-8 ). While web traffic had been steadily increasing since the creation of the website in 2009, it experienced a deceleration in growth, or even a slight decline, in the months that preceded the change in terms of use. Web traffic then increased again following the change. This pattern could also be consistent with increased uncertainty regarding the contractual arrangement between backers and creators and their respective rights and obligations, which was then resolved by the rule change. We do not control for this last set of factors (Google searches, web traffic, and number of projects receiving negative attention) in our analysis as these are effectively subsumed by our subcategory×year-month fixed effects. 4
Finally, in Figure OA -9, we report Kickstarter's aggregate goal and amount pledged.
Note that the main source of Kickstarter's revenues are the fees it receives for successfullyfunded projects. These fees are defined as a percentage of the total amount pledged by backers.
While Kickstarter had been experiencing an increase in the total goal amount (i.e., the total amount of funds requested by creators) leading up to the change in terms of use, this increase was not accompanied by a comparable increase in the amount of funds pledged by backers. It is possible, therefore, that the change in rules was also driven by a relative decrease in amount pledged. 5 As this could be a potentially important trigger of the rule change whose effect would not be absorbed by our fixed effects structure, we include lagged aggregate amount pledged as 4 Note that Google Trends data and web traffic data are only available at the aggregate year-month level. 5 Note that, in absolute terms, amount pledged continued to increase throughout our sample period. a percentage of aggregate goal amount at the state and year-level as an additional control in our model specifications. 6
Disclosure and Project Success by Size
In Table OA -4, we examine the extent to which the association between project success and disclosure is observed across different project size (i.e., funding goal) categories. We find that project success exhibits a positive and significant association with disclosure across all size categories. A one standard deviation increase in the length of the campaign pitch (risks and challenges section) is associated with a 1.2 to 2.0 (0.8 to 2.3) percentage points increase in probability of success and a U.S. $146 to U.S. $955 (U.S. $111 to U.S. $465) increase in amount pledged.
Additional Robustness Tests
In this section, we present a set of sensitivity tests assessing the robustness of our findings. Our main analyses are based on the location of the project (as opposed to the location of the project backers). This research design choice is supported by the following two arguments. First, if a creator is a resident of a given state and does substantial business (i.e., it markets, advertises, distributes, sells, and receives substantial profits from sales) within that state, then the appropriate venue for a consumer protection lawsuit would be that specific state.
Second, prior literature documents a significant home-bias even though crowdfunding is not geographically constrained (Agrawal et al., 2011, Lin and Viswanathan, 2015) . Nevertheless, to the extent that certain project locations are different from the location of their backers, location may be measured with error. 7 To alleviate this concern, we conduct a sensitivity test in which we limit our sample to projects for which most backers reside in the project state.
Kickstarter provides information (in the community tab) on the top 10 cities in which backers are located, as well as on the number of backers in each of these cities. Based on these data, we compute the percentage of project backers that hail from the project state. Note that our measure is conservative, as we are only able to observe backers in the top 10 cities. We limit our sample to projects for which more than 50% of backers are in the project state. Table   OA -5, Panel A, presents the results of this analysis. We find that the coefficient on our variable of interest, , is positive and significant across all disclosure and project success proxies. The fact that we observe an increase in the credibility of the campaign pitch (risks and challenges section) in this subsample of 30,351 (22,585) observations increases our confidence in the robustness of our main findings.
Moreover, because some of the projects in our sample have been cancelled or suspended, project success may also be measured with error. When a project is cancelled or suspended by Kickstarter or directly by creators, the reason for the lack of success may not be related to the unwillingness of backers to support that project. Yet, in our main analysis we code such projects as unfunded (i.e., is equal to 0). To alleviate the concern that our findings may be driven by potential measurement error, we conduct further sensitivity tests in which we exclude cancelled and suspended projects from our sample. Table OA -5, Panel B, reports the results of these tests. The coefficient on the interaction term remains significantly positive across all disclosure and project success proxies also within this smaller subsample.
Finally, some creators may return to Kickstarter multiple times with different projects hence building reputation. The effect of disclosure on project success may thus be confounded by the performance of creators in previous campaigns. To allay this concern, in Table OA-5, Panel C, we limit our sample to projects of first-time creators. We continue to find an increase in the credibility of disclosure following the rule change across all disclosure and project success proxies.
Treatment Effect Stability
While the different fixed effects structures that we employ in the tests presented in Table   4 , Panel C and the results of our cross-sectional tests presented in Table 6 already alleviate, to a great extent, a potential omitted variable bias in our empirical analysis, in this section we implement the bounding methodology proposed by Oster (2019) to assess the stability of our treatment effects and evaluate their robustness to omitted variable bias.
Specifically, we re-estimate our main model specifications (Table 3 , Panel A, Columns
(2) and (4) and Table 3 , Panel B, Columns (1) and (2) of the paper) with and without project, creator, and macro-level control variables. We then assume a value for R max (the R 2 from a hypothetical regression of the outcome on treatment and both observed and unobserved control variables) and, based on this assumption, calculate the value of delta (the relative degree of selection on observed and unobserved control variables) for which the treatment effect would be zero. Delta is a function of R max and the change in the coefficient on and R 2 as the control variables are included in the regression. Following Oster (2019), we set R max equal to 1.3 multiplied by the R 2 of the regression that includes all control variables. We present the results of this analysis in Table OA-6. Our deltas range from 1.7 to 2.7 (across the different disclosure and funding variables). This suggests that, depending on the disclosure and funding variable, the unobservables would need to be 1.7 to 2.7 times as important as the observables to produce a treatment effect of zero. When R max is set more conservatively to 1.5 multiplied by the R 2 of the controlled regression, deltas range from 1 to 1.5 (untabulated). The magnitude of these deltas provides further reassurance that the treatment effect that we document is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables.
Additional Evidence on Disclosure Changes
Our analysis of the type of language used in project disclosures is based on lists of words.
As these lists necessarily involve some discretion, we also examine the keyness (i.e., the relative frequency of words) in the campaign pitch and risks and challenges section for projects starting before and after the rule change. Figure OA -10 plots the highest values of the χ 2 -test statistic for differences in the frequency of words in the "pre" and "post" period. Following the change in Kickstarter's terms of use, creators increasingly use words such as "product," "campaign," "business," "manufacturing," "shipping," "risk," and "documentation" in their campaign pitches. The type of words used in the risks and challenges section also appears to change, with words such as "report," "accountability," "learn," "check," "questions,"
"campaign," being, for example, more frequently used. In line with our main findings, the evidence emerging from this additional analysis points to an increase in the use of legal, as well as business, terms. "Today, Kickstarter announced that it has revised its Terms to make them more readable and to include an entire section that spells out creators' obligations to their backers. The section, entitled "How Projects Work," puts this duty in language that leaves less room for interpretation. "When a project is successfully funded, the creator must complete the project and fulfill each reward," reads the updated Terms (bolding in original text). "Once a creator has done so, they've satisfied their obligation to their backers." (continued) "Kickstarter has decided to update its famously laissez-faire attitude when it comes to protecting donors who have pledged more than $1 billion through the company over the years. The new terms state that a successfully funded campaign that fails to produce "rewards," i.e. the product, may have to "return remaining funds." If not, they could be "subject to legal action by backers." Backers could previously sue campaign creators, but rarely did so. The new rules, which go into effect on October 19th, make the potential for a lawsuit more explicit (check out the differences here). The amended TOS says that by backing a project, donors are entering into a "contract" with creators. Kickstarter then lists all the things a creator has to do if a product does not materialize, including "offer to return any remaining funds." If creators fails to bring the contract to the "best possible conclusion," the "legal action" part kicks in." (continued) (1), the average sentiment of backer comments for successful (i.e., funded) projects in Column (2), the percentage of successful projects with backers discussing delays in Column (3), and the percentage of successful projects with fraud allegations by backers in Column (4). All model specifications are estimated using OLS and include state and year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. of the analysis that examines how the association between disclosure and project success varies according to project size. Extra small projects have a funding goal below U.S. $5,000, Small projects have a funding goal that ranges between U.S. $5,000 and U.S. $10,000, Medium projects have a funding goal that ranges between U.S. $10,000 and U.S. $15,000, and Large projects have a funding goal above U.S. $15,000. In Panel A (Panel B) the dependent variable is ( ). In both panels, is measured as and in Columns (1) to (4) and (5) to (8), respectively. All model specifications are estimated using OLS and include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B of the paper. 
Independent variables:
(1) (2) (3) (4) 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.348*** 0.220*** (2.89) (4.82) (8.59) (4.60) -0.025*** -0.011*** -0.142*** -0.096*** (-7.45) (-3.76) (-6.41) (-4.61) 0.002 -0.000 0.027 0.024 (0.59) (-0.10) (0.82) (0.62) -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.005 (-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.83) (-1.15) 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.025*** 0.023*** results of three robustness tests. In Panel A, we limit the sample to projects for which more than 50% of the top 10 backers are from the respective project's state. In Panel B, we exclude from the sample those projects that have been cancelled or suspended. In Panel C, we exclude projects of creators that have previously launched other projects on Kickstarter. In all panels, the dependent variable is in Columns (1) and (2) and in Columns (3) and (4) and is measured as in odd-numbered columns and in even-numbered columns. All model specifications are estimated using OLS and include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B of the paper.
